

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2097
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 BRASILIA 4682

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TAGS OVIP SHUM ENRG ECON PARM BR XM XR XA XJ
SUBJECT: MEMO OF CONVERSATION: MRS. CARTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER
SILVEIRA

REF: STATE 131481

1. SUMMARY: DURING ONE HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTE MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA, MRS. CARTER OUTLINED PRESIDENT'S BASIC
FOREIGN POLICY PRECEPTS AND OBJECTIVES AND REAFFIRMED IMPORTANCE TO
PRESIDENT OF CLOSE COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION WITH BRAZIL. MRS.
CARTER GAVE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS TO PRESIDENT'S HOPES FOR AFFIRMATIVE
INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH SHE STRESSED WAS NOT
DIRECTED AGAINST ANY ONE COUNTRY OR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES AND DID NOT
SEEK NARROW POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. SHE ALSO REITERATED THE PRESIDENT'S
DEEP COMMITMENT TO HALTING THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND REDUCING THOSE NOW STOCKPILED.
FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA UNDERScoreD BRAZIL'S COMMITMENT TO HUMAN
RIGHTS, BUT CALLED FOR UNDERSTANDING OF LATIN AMERICA'S DIFFERENT
CIRCUMSTANCES AND HISTORICAL FORCES IN THE
SOCIETY FOR WHICH STATES CANNOT ALWAYS BE HELD RESPONSIBLE.
CLEARLY REFERRING TO THE SOUTHERN CONE MEETING, HE EXPLAINED THAT
BRAZIL HAS OPPOSED HOLDING A HIGH-LEVEL REGIONAL MEETING TO DISCUSS
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THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, SINCE ITS SITUATION IS DIFFERENT FROM
THAT OF OTHER STATES INVOLVED. ON THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM,
SILVEIRA EXPLAINED THAT BRAZIL BELIEVES IN SAFEGUARDS AND OPPOSES
BOTH HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL PROLIFERATION, BUT IT WILL NEVER
ACCEPT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY. HE NOTED THAT
BRAZIL, THOUGH IT HAS NOT RATIFIED TLaTELOLCO, CONSIDERS ITSELF
COMMITTED. BUT HE RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO MRS. CARTER'S SUGGESTION

THAT BRAZIL WAIVE THE CONDITIONS FOR MAKING TLATELOLCO FULLY EFFECTIVE, EXPLAINING THAT THIS WAS BRAZIL'S MEANS OF PRESSURING THE SOVIET UNION TO ADHERE. DISCUSSIONS ALSO RANGED OVER US AND BRAZILIAN POLICIES TOWARD CUBA, PROSPECTS FOR THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG AFTER CIEC, US TRADE POLICIES AND THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONALS, BRAZIL'S ROLE IN AFRICA, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ANGOLA, AND THE OUTLOOK FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

2. AMERICAN OFFICIALS ACCOMPANYING MRS. CARTER DURING HER ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA ON JUNE 6 WERE AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY TODMAN, ROBERT PASTOR OF THE NSC STAFF, PRESS AIDE MARY HOYT, AND EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAVID SIMCOX. BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS PRESENT WITH SILVEIRA WERE SECRETARY-GENERAL RAMIRO GUERREIRO, SPECIAL SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS GERALDO HOLLANDA CAVALCANTI, CHIEF OF AMERICAS DEPARTMENT JOA HERMES PERREIRA ARAUJO, SPECIAL ADVISER FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS JOSE NOGUEIRA, AND STAFF AIDE CELSO AMORIM.

3. MRS. CARTER OPENED THE SUBSTANTIVE PART OF THE CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING HER SATISFACTION AT BEING IN BRAZIL. SHE EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO REMAIN IN THE US DURING MOST OF THE MONTHS AHEAD, AND HE HAD THEREFORE WANTED MRS. CARTER TO COME TO THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA EARLY IN HIS ADMINISTRATION TO ASSURE THEM OF HIS DESIRE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY AND TO CONSULT WITH THEM ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.

4. REVIEWING SOME OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY, MRS. CARTER NOTED FIRST THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTS CONFIDENTIAL

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AN OPEN APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS NO LESS THAN IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. HE DOES NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING ABROAD THAT HE WOULD NOT DO AT HOME, AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING TO OTHERS THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT DONE TO US. SECONDLY, THE PRESIDENT FEELS THAT UNTIL NOW US POLICY HAS BEEN HEAVILY CONCERNED WITH THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES--PRINCIPALLY THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND JAPAN. THE PRESIDENT THINKS OUR CONCERN SHOULD BE BRADER. THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE LESS DEVELOPED MUST SEEK TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER SO THAT THEY CAN BETTER FACE THEIR COMMON PROBLEMS.

5. IN THIS RESPECT, MRS. CARTER ADDED, LATIN AMERICA AND BRAZIL ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THEIR POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE EMERGING WORLD. SHE NOTED THAT HER TRIP WAS SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO GET THE VIEWS OF BRAZIL ON HOW BEST THE UNITED STATES COULD WORK WITH BRAZIL AND WITH LATIN AMERICA. IF THERE WAS ANY RELUCTANCE BY THE US TO ENGAGE IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG, SHE EXPLAINED, THAT TIME HAS PASSED. THE UNITED STATES IS NOW EAGER TO PARTICIPATE. BRAZIL WITH ITS GREAT INFLUENCE HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN MAKING OUR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS MORE EQUITABLE.

CERTAINLY THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES WE HAVE TO LOOK AT THESE INSTITUTIONS

ANew AND SEEK WAYS TO MAKE THEM MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS
OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

6. ANOTHER POINT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY, MRS.
CARTER NOTED, IS THAT OUR PAST FEAR OF COMMUNISM MADE US EMBRACE
DICTATORS OF ANY TYPE; BUT IN THE US NOW THERE IS A FEELING OF
OPTIMISM AND CONFIDENCE THAT HISTORY IS ON THE SIDE OF LIBERTY.
THE PRESIDENT, WHO WANTED THAT FEELING OF CONFIDENCE EXPRESSED,
IS ALSO COMMITTED TO ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL PROGRESS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS.

7. MRS. CARTER REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO CREATE
CONDITIONS TO DIVERT RESOURCES FROM DEFENSE TO DEVELOPMENT. AS
PRESIDENT, HE WANTS TO SEE THE REDUCTION, AND ULTIMATELY THE
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PRINCIPALLY, THIS MEANS AVOIDING
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NEW PROLIFERATION AND REDUCING THE STOCKS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW
HELD. MRS. CARTER CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S

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EARLIEST CONCERNS WAS ALSO TO LIMIT SALES OF CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS. THE US WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO INTRODUCE
NEW WEAPONS INTO A REGION AND WILL SEEK TO AVOID

STEPS THAT HAVE THE EFFECT OF ESCALATING COMPETITION IN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. THE US HOPES TO WORK TOWARD THESE GOALS IN COOPERATION WITH ARM'S SUPPLIERS AND PURCHASERS.

8. A FINAL POINT, MRS. CARTER STRESSED, WAS THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES. HE DOES NOT FAVOR PERPETUAL HOSTILITY WITH CUBA AND BELIEVES THAT TO MODERATE CUBA'S BEHAVIOR WE MUST PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO THE CUBANS. MRS. CARTER CONCLUDED BY REAFFIRMING THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO CONSULT AND COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA ON DEVELOPMENT MATTERS. A SIGN OF HIS DESIRE TO CONSULT WAS THE US APPROACH TO THE SUGAR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH MRS. CARTER EXPLAINED SHE HAD PARTICIPATED IN. REITERATING THAT SHE IS HERE IN BRASILIA AS AN INDICATION OF HIS DESIRE TO CONSULT, MRS. CARTER ASKED FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S COMMENTS.

9. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA THANKED MRS. CARTER FOR
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HER SINCERE EXPLANATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY, ADDING THAT HE WOULD SPEAK WITH FRANKNESS. A KEY POINT IN US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS, AS HE SAW IT, WAS THAT THEIR VOLUME WAS SO LARGE THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT OUR VIEWS WILL NOT ALWAYS COINCIDE. FOR THIS REASON, BRAZIL BELIEVES IN CONSULTATIONS SO AS TO AVOID "ACCIDENTS OF THE ROAD."

10. SILVEIRA SAW THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN BRAZIL. THE PRESIDENT'S MOST EFFECTIVE AND MATURE SPEECH ON FOREIGN POLICY WAS THE LAST ONE HE MADE. TO SILVEIRA, THE QUESTION WAS WHERE HUMAN RIGHTS ARE TO BE INSERTED AS A "CATALYZER" OF INTERACTION (SIC). BRAZIL ALSO BELIEVES IN HUMAN RIGHTS, SILVEIRA EXPLAINED, SINCE ALL STATES HAVE A MORAL DUTY TO OBSERVE THEM. BRAZIL HAS TAKEN PART IN INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS AND ACCEPTS INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES AND IS GAINING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. HE RECALLED THAT BRAZIL HAD JUST BEEN ELECTED TO THE UNHRC, HAVING COME IN FOURTH IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS JUST BEHIND THE US. BUT BRAZIL NOW IS AT THE STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE US OF 30 OR 40 YEARS AGO, NOT IN THE POSITION OF THE US RIGHT NOW.

11. SILVEIRA CONTINUED BY POINTING OUT MARXISM DOES NOT PERMEATE US SOCIETY, WHICH HAS BUILT IN MECHANISMS THAT RESIST IT. LATIN AMERICA, HOWEVER, DOES NOT HAVE THESE ADVANTAGES AND IT HAS CONSIDERABLE MARXIST PENETRATION. THE SMALLER COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA HAVE EVEN SUFFERED INVASIONS FROM CUBA. EXPLAINING BRAZIL'S CUBA POLICY,

SILVEIRA SAID BRAZIL DECIDED TO ABSTAIN (IN THE OAS) ON CUBA SANCTIONS BECAUSE IT HAD FOUND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE HIDING BEHIND BRAZIL'S OPPOSITION ON THE ISSUE AND NOT TAKING RESPONSIBILITY; THEREFORE BRAZIL DECIDED NO LONGER TO FIGHT INITIATIVES IN FAVOR OF CUBA. BUT HE CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT IF THE VOTE AT COSTA RICA (ON CUBA SANCTIONS) WAS TAKEN NOW THE OUTCOME WOULD NOT BE THE SAME, FOR THE SMALLER LATIN AMERICAN STATES ARE MORE FEARFUL NOW OF
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CUBAN INFILTRATION--SUCH STATES AS COSTA RICA, URUGUAY, PARAGUAY AND BOLIVIA.

12. SILVEIRA EXPLAINED THAT BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY IS CHARACTERIZED BY "RESPONSIBLE PRAGMATISM," WHICH GENERALLY MEANS RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD REGARDLESS OF SOCIAL SYSTEM. BRAZIL IS CRITICIZED AT TIMES FOR THIS APPROACH BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH PEKING OR WITH SOME RADICAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES. BUT IN ITS "RESPONSIBLE PRAGMATISM," BRAZIL MAKES AN EXCEPTION IN THE CASE OF CUBA, SINCE A BRAZILIAN OPENING TO CUBA WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY BRAZIL'S SMALLER NEIGHBORS.

13. SILVEIRA NOTED THAT SINCE BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY BASE QUITE NATURALLY IS SOUTH AMERICA, THAT BASE MUST BE CONSTRUCTED OF HEALTHY RELATIONSHIPS. BRAZIL HOPES TO HAVE ITS NEIGHBORS TO THE NORTH JOIN WITH IT IN AN AMAZON AGREEMENT TO PROTECT THE ECOLOGY OF THE REGION AND SHARE EXPERIENCE. BRAZIL IS READY TO CALL A MEETING OF AMAZON STATES' FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BRASILIA SOON. BRAZIL, HE ADDED, HAS A LARGE VOLUME OF TRADE WITH ITS SOUTH AMERICAN NEIGHBORS, BEGINNING WITH ARGENTINA. IT IS THE PRIMARY TRADING PARTNER OF A NUMBER OF NEIGHBORING STATES ALREADY AND, WITH EXCEPTION OF VENEZUELA, WHOSE TRADE IS MORE TIED TO THE US, WILL BECOME THE PRIMARY PARTNER OF OTHERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF BRAZIL'S HEAVY WEIGHT AND ITS VORACITY FOR IMPORTS. HE REMARKED THAT IN 1963 BRAZIL'S TOTAL VOLUME OF TRADE HAD BEEN \$2.5 BILLION; IN 1977 THIS HAS RISEN TO \$23 BILLION, THOUGH HE NOTED THAT SUCH GROWTH HAD NOT SOLVED BRAZIL'S PROBLEMS. (SILVEIRA RECALLED WITH AMUSEMENT THAT WHEN HE WAS A YOUNG DIPLOMAT AN ECONOMIC ADVISORY MISSION (THE ABBINK MISSION) HAD COME TO BRAZIL AND CONCLUDED THAT BRAZIL COULD SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS BY INCREASING ITS EXPORTS FROM \$400 MILLION TO \$600 MILLION ANNUALLY.)

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14. SILVEIRA REPEATED THAT BRAZIL FAVORS A POLICY OF RELATIONS WITH ALL NATIONS, THOUGH SOUTH AMERICA AND AFRICA ARE NOW ITS MAIN AREAS OF PREOCCUPATION. SILVEIRA SAID THAT BRAZIL IS IN LARGE PART AFRICAN AND, WHILE RACIAL PREJUDICE HAD EXISTED HERE OF COURSE, BRAZIL HAS NEVER HAD A SITUATION WHERE ORGANIZATIONS EXISTED TO PROTECT PREJUDICE OR WHERE PERSONS WERE ACTUALLY PROUD OF THEIR PREJUDICE. THIS ATTITUDE ARISES FROM BRAZIL'S PORTUGUESE-SPANISH ORIGINS, WHICH FOSTERED A SENSE OF RACIAL CO-EXISTENCE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING TO WHICH THE EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS LATER HAD TO ADAPT.

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15. TURNING BACK TO THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SILVEIRA WAS AWARE THAT "DRAMATIC SITUATIONS" EXIST IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY, BUT DID NOT BELIEVE THE COUNTRIES THEMSELVES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM. BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, HE TOOK NOTE OF THE "RELIGIOUS WAR" IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH HAS DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS FOR WHICH THE BRITISH CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE. HE AGAIN NOTED THAT BRAZIL IS IN THE SAME POSITION NOW AS THE US 25 YEARS AGO. BRAZIL DOES NOT WANT TO SACRIFICE ITS INDEPENDENCE AND IT HATES INTERFERENCE, AS IT IS STILL TOO VULNERABLE. EVEN SO, HE CONTINUED, BRAZIL COOPERATES CLOSELY WITH ITS SOUTH AMERICAN NEIGHBORS AND WITH THE US, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH US PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, WHICH HAS COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH BRAZIL AND INVESTED EXTENSIVELY. THESE MULTINATIONALS SHOULD, OF COURSE, ABIDE BY THE LAWS OF THE HOST COUNTRY. SINCE, THESE MULTINATIONALS HAVE A TENDENCY TO "DECENTRALIZE"

WEALTH AND ARE NOT SO TIED TO THE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN. BRAZIL
ANTS THEM TO IMPROVE THEIR OPERATIONS HERE.

16. TAKING UP TRADE MATTERS, SILVEIRA SAID OF COURSE THERE ARE
PROBLEMS IN BRAZIL'S RELATIONS WITH THE US. FOR EXAMPLE, BRAZIL
CANNOT ACCEPT THAT THE INTERNAL LAWS OF THE US TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER TREATIES, OR THAT, AS THE US WOULD HAVE IT, US IMPORTS ARE
PROTECTED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND US EXPORTS BY INTERNATIONAL
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AGREEMENT. BRAZIL IS ALSO COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DIS-
CRIMINATION, THOUGH IT UNDERSTANDS THE NEEDS OF THE VERY POOR
COUNTRIES AND ACCEPTS IN ITS OWN TRADE PRACTICES A SPECIAL TREATMENT
FOR SOME SMALLER COUNTRIES, SUCH AS ECUADOR OR PARAGUAY. MRS.
CARTER INQUIRED AS TO THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE CIEC.
SILVEIRA REPLIED THAT CIEC'S OBJECTIVES WERE NOT SOMETHING THAT
COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN 18 MONTHS. HE RECALLED HAVING TOLD SECRETARY
VANCE IN PARIS THAT WE SHOULD BE HONEST IN ASSESSING TIS
RESULTS, FOR IF THERE WERE AN EFFORT TO PRESENT AN ARTIFICIAL
SUCCESS THERE MIGHT BE APPLAUSE FOR TWO DAYS, FOLLOWED BY GREATER
CRITICISM.

17. MRS. CARTER ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN SOME POSITIVE FIRST
STEPS IN CIEC AND WHERE THE PROCESS SHOULD GO FROM HERE.
SILVEIRA BELIEVED THE DIALOG WAS PRODUCING GREATER ACCEPTANCE ON
EACH SIDE OF THE OTHER'S IDEAS. HE FELT THAT THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
FROM THE BEGINNING HAD SEEN CIEC PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF STABILIZING
PETROLEUM PRICES. HE RECALLED REMINDING SECRETARY VANCE THAT,
DESPITE THE GOOD RELATIONS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH
SAUDI ARABIA, IT WAS A MISTAKE TO BET ALL ON ONE COUNTRY, FOR
HE KNEW THE SAUDIS WOULD BE FORCED TO RETREAT ON PETROLEUM PRICES
SINCE RADICALS USUALLY TEND TO WIN OUT IN CONFRONTATIONS OF THIS
SORT.

18. MRS. CARTER WONDERED WHETHER BRAZIL WITH ITS PROGRESS WAS
REALLY STILL A LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY. SILVEIRA BELIEVED IT WAS,
SINCE NO NATION CAN BE DECLARED DEVELOPED BY DECREE. HE
EXPLAINED THAT THE BASIC CRITERION OF DEVELOPMENT IS NOT SOME
STATISTICAL INDICATOR, SUCH AS GNP, BUT THE ABILITY OF A COUNTRY
TO INFLUENCE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DECISIONS. THE DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES HAVE POWER IN INTERNATIONAL DECISION, WHILE THE LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES MERELY RECEIVE THEIR PRESCRIPTIONS WITHOUT
PARTICIPATION. THE DOORS MUST BE OPENED TO THE LESS DEVELOPED IN MAKING

DECISIONS. MRS. CARTER NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES ALSO
THAT THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE TO BE CHANGED AND OPENED
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UP.

19. TURNING TO NUCLEAR MATTERS, SILVEIRA SAID BRAZIL IS AGAINST PROLIFERATION. THOUGH IT SEES VERTICAL PROLIFERATION AS THE REAL DANGER, THIS SHOULD NOT BE THE EXCUSE FOR ALLOWING HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION, EVEN THOUGH IT IS QUITE CLEAR NO ONE IS GOING TO BALANCE THE NUCLEAR POWER OF THE US OR THE SOVIET UNION. MRS. CARTER COMMENTED THAT THE US INTEREST IS NOT IN BALANCING, BUT IN REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTING THEIR SPREAD. AMBASSADOR GUERREIRO COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE BALANCED AT A LOWER LEVEL.

20. SILVEIRA NOTED THAT MRS. CARTER HAD MENTIONED THE WESTERN WORLD, RECOGNIZING THAT THERE IS STILL A CHALLENGE BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD. AS SILVEIRA SAW IT, THE US IS ACCEPTING THE CHALLENGE OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD WITH A MORAL ANSWER THAT WILL HAVE EFFECTIVE RESULTS, AS IT IS DIRECTED CHIEFLY AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST STATES. THUS, THE PRIMARY INTEREST OF THE US IS NOT IN SUCH AREAS AS LATIN AMERICA OR AFRICA. HE SAW, AS A RESULT, THAT "EVERYONE IS MAD AT THE US," WITH CHILE AS A GOOD EXAMPLE. HE COMMENTED THAT NOTHING IN LATIN AMERICAN SOCIETY COMPARES WITH CONDITIONS IN THE SOCIALIST WORLD, WHERE EVERYTHING IS MONITORED BY POLICE. SMALL COUNTRIES SUCH AS URUGUAY, WOULD LIKE TO SUPPORT THE US, BUT THEY NOW FEEL A GREAT RESENTMENT. THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE BRAZIL "YELLING" AT THE US, BUT BRAZIL IS NOT ANTI-US AND TRIES TO MODERATE THEIR APPROACH.

21. MRS. CARTER NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY IS NOT DIRECTED AT ANY ONE AREA OR COUNTRY AND THAT IT HAS MUCH MORE THAN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES: IT IS MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ENDING HUNGER AND OPPRESSION AND IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE. MRS. CARTER THEN OBSERVED SHE UNDERSTOOD THAT BRAZIL AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION WERE PLANNING A MEETING TO TALK ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS.

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22. AFTER COMMENTING THAT HE HAD KNOWN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD LEARN ABOUT THE MEETING AND THAT HE HAD TOLD "THEM" SO, SILVEIRA REPLIED THAT BRAZIL HAD OPPOSED THE MEETING. THE OTHERS BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD CONVINCE THE US TO BE AWARE OF OTHER FACTS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. BRAZIL IS ALWAYS WILLING TO TALK THINGS OVER WITH THE CONCERNED COUNTRIES AND LIKES TO TRY TO PLAY A MODERATING ROLE, BUT BRAZIL CANNOT ACCEPT A SITUATION NOT APPLICABLE TO IT, AS BRAZIL IS NOT IN A SITUATION SUCH AS ARGENTINA. BRAZIL HAS A FUNCTIONING CONGRESS, A FREE PRESS AND EVEN STUDENT STRIKES. IT DOES NOT HAVE KILLINGS IN THE STREETS AS DOES ARGENTINA. ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE THE GOB TRIES TO REMAIN CALM AND PRESIDENT GEISEL HAS ENOUGH AUTHORITY TO RESIST PRESSURES.

23. IN THIS CONNECTION, SILVEIRA REPLIED THAT BRAZIL IS A COMPLEX SOCIETY, SOMETHING LIKE THE US. IT HAS VARIED SECTORS OF OPINION AND PRESSURE AND INTERESTS GROUPS TO DEAL WITH. HE COMMENTED THAT, TO MAINTAIN AN OPEN FOREIGN POLICY, HE HAS PAID A HIGH PRICE IN TERMS OF CRITICISM FROM THE PRESS, WHICH IS LINKED TO OTHER INTERESTS, AND FROM THOSE COMPLEX PUBLIC OPINION SECTORS AND PRESSURE GROUPS.

24. MRS. CARTER REITERATED THAT THE TIME WAS NOW PAST IN WHICH EVERYTHING WAS CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF THE US VERSUS THE COMMUNISTS.
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IN ITS PLACE, SHE ADDED, THERE IS A CONFIDENCE NOW THAT THE WORLD IS READY FOR FREEDOM. SILVEIRA WONDERED WHETHER THIS MEANT THE US COULD UNILATERALLY RENOUNCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MR. PASTOR REPLIED THAT COMPETITION BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD HAS NOT BEEN ELIMINATED; INDEED IT IS MORE INTENSIVE AND MORE VARIED.

25. SILVEIRA NOTED THAT ONE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT COULD BE THE INCINERATION OF THE WORLD, WHICH IS WHY A BALANCE IS SO IMPORTANT. BUT HE CAUTIONED THAT THIS BALANCE CANNOT BE PRESERVED FOREVER. MRS. CARTER BELIEVED THAT IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT PEOPLE WOULD LIKE TO SEE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DONE AWAY WITH. SHE BELIEVED THAT IF SOME MOVES COULD BE MADE IN THIS DIRECTION NOW IT WOULD BE OF GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE WORLD.

26. SILVEIRA REPLIED THAT BRAZIL ACCEPTS NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND BELIEVES IN THEM. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL NEVER ACCEPT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY. HE ASSERTED THAT EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT IT IS THE RICH COUNTRIES--NOT THE POOR ONES--THAT MAKE BIG WARS. MRS. CARTER AGREED THAT THOSE WHO

NOW HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD START WITH REDUCTIONS. SILVEIRA REJOINED THAT BRAZIL WILL DO ANYTHING TO LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EVEN THOUGH ITS INTENTIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS BELIEVED. WITH REGARD TO THE TREAT OF TLATELOLCO, SILVEIRA ADDED, FROM THE MOMENT BRAZIL SIGNED THE TREATY--EVEN THOUGH IT HAS NOT RATIFIED--IT ACCEPTED THE OBLIGATION NOT TO HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

27. MRS. CARTER NOTED THAT IF BRAZIL WOULD EXERCISE THE WAIVER FOR BRINGING THE TLATELOLCO TREATY INTO FORCE IT WOULD SHOW THE REST OF THE WORLD THAT BRAZIL HAS NO INTENTION OF MAKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SILVEIRA REPLIED THAT BRAZIL HAS ALREADY SIGNED A TRILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE FRG AND IAEA, THUS ACCEPTING A COMMITMENT NOT TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WITH REGARD TO TLATELOLCO, BRAZIL ALREADY CONSIDERS ITSELF COMMITTED IN TERMS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. TO MR. PASTOR'S COMMENT THAT THE NEXT STEP, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE EASY, SILVEIRA REPLIED THAT BRAZIL DOES NOT USE THE WAIVER BECAUSE IT WANTS TO PRESSURE THE SOVIET UNION ON THE CONFIDENTIAL

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STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO ACCEPT TLATELOLCO. IN THIS REGARD, HE APPEALED TO THE US TO RESPECT BRAZIL, WHICH, HE REMARKED, "IS NOT HONDURAS," AND ITS IDEAS AND ITS STRATEGY. THE US AT TIMES THINKS IT CAN DIRECT EVERYTHING. MRS. CARTER REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NEVER THOUGHT THAT WAY, HE HAS NEVER TRIED TO TELL OTHER COUNTRIES WHAT TO DO. BUT SACRIFICES MUST BE MADE, SHE CONTINUED, JUST AS THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNING OF PROTOCOL I TLATELOLCO WAS

A SACRIFICE.

28. SILVEIRA CALLED ON THE US TO UNDERSTAND THAT BRAZIL IS A STATUS QUO POWER, NOT INTERESTED IN UPSETTING THE SOUTH AMERICAN BALANCE. BRAZIL IS A REGIONAL POWER WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF CERTAIN INFLUENCE IN ITS AREA, BUT IT LACKS THE ECONOMIC OR MILITARY STRENGTH TO HAVE THE SAME WEIGHT AS THE US. IN ITS OWN REGION, HOWEVER, BRAZIL MUST USE ITS INFLUENCE, AND SINCE IT CANNOT PLEASE OTHERS IT MUST FIRST PLEASE ITSELF. BRAZIL, HE CONTINUED, HAS A GOOD RECORD OF STANDING BY ITS TREATIES--INDEED BETTER THAN MOST OTHER COUNTRIES. BUT BRAZIL HAS ITS DESTINY, WHICH CANNOT BE CHANGED.

29. MRS. CARTER NOTED THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS HAVE DONE A GOOD JOB AS THEIR REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME IS A MODEL FOR THE WORLD. SILVEIRA AGREED, NOTHING THAT BRAZIL HAD TAKEN THE LEAD IN BRINGING IT ABOUT.

30. MRS. CARTER INQUIRED ABOUT BRAZIL'S VIEWS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. AS SILVEIRA SAW IT, A SOLUTION WAS URGENT FOR THE PROBLEMS OF NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA. WHAT IS NEEDED MOST IS THE PLITICAL WILL TO BRING ABOUT THE END OF WHITE RULE. HE DID NOT SEE THIS AS DIFFICLT AS IT SOUNDS, BECAUSE IN RHODESIA THE WHITES ARE NOW NUMEROUS.

INDEED FRANCE REPATRIATED MORE WHITES FROM ALGERIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE
THEN ARE NOW IN RHODESIA. HE SAW SOUTH AFRICA AS QUITE DIFFERENT.
IT WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE MIDDLE-AND LONG-TERM. THE WHITE MINORITY
IS LARGE AND LONG ESTABLISHED. THUS A

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ACTION ARA-14

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COMPROMISE WILL BE NECESSARY. HE NOTED THAT APARTHEID IS NOT AN
OLD INSTITUTION, SINCE IT WAS BORN OUT OF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN
TWO WHITE MINORITIES ONLY ABOUT 30 YEARS AGO. BRAZIL, WHICH
OWES ITS ORIGINS TO AFRICA AS MUCH AS TO ANY OTHER REGION, IS
STRONGLY AGAINST APARTHEID. THEREFORE, BRAZIL COULD NEVER SUPPORT
SOUTH AFRICA, THOUGH HE ADDED, THERE ARE SOME IMPORTANT ELEMENTS
IN BRAZIL THAT BELIEVE THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAS IMPORTANT STRATEGIC
POWER. HE HIMSELF RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF THAT POWER BUT IT IS
MEANINGLESS BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE EXERCISED.

31. MRS. CARTER INQUIRED INTO BRAZIL'S ROLE IN AFRICA. SILVEIRA
SAW ITS ROLE AS ONE OF UNDERSTANDING, PLAYED PRINCIPALLY THROUGH THE
BRAZILIAN INFLUENCE IN THE FORMER PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES. HE
BELIEVED BRAZIL SHOULD PLAY THE CARD OF THE AFRICAN NATIONALISTS WHOSE

RADICAL APPROACH HAD TO BE VIEWED WITH SYMPATHY AND TOLERANCE, SINCE
THEY FACE THE HUGE PROBLEM OF STRUGGLING WITH PREJUDICE,
TRIBALISM. AND COLONIALISM.

32. SILVEIRA RECALLED THAT WITH THE PREVIOUS US ADMINISTRATION,
BRAZIL HAS EXCHANGED PAPES ABOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA DURING PLANNING
STAFF MEETINGS. HE WAS A BELIEVER IN MIXING PLANNERS AND OPERATORS
IN CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AS IT IS AN UNHEALTHY SITUATION IF
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THEY ARE APART. BRAZIL NOW HAS JOINT PLANNING STAFF MEETINGS WITH THE BRITISH, AND TO SOME EXTENT WITH THE FRENCH AND THE JAPANESE, BOTH OF WHOM HE SAID WERE HARDER TO WORK WITH.

3. MRS. CARTER EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT BRAZIL WAS POWERFUL IN LATIN AMERICA AND COULD THEREFORE DO A GREAT DEAL. SHE ASKED HOW THE US COULD WORK WITH BRAZIL. SILVEIRA SAW BRAZIL'S POWER AS ONLY A "PARTICLE" COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE US. HE SAID BRAZIL IS AGAINST A CONFRONTATION APPROACH IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG, ADDING THAT THE IDEAL OF THE LDCS IS NOT TO OVERTHROW THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES BUT TO BECOME DEVELOPED COUNTRIES THEMSELVES. HE THOUGH A MORE PRECISE MODEL WAS NEEDED FOR CIEC. SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN NOTED IN PARIS, BUT ABOUT 48 HOURS BEFORE THE END OF THE CONFERENCE, THE ATMOSPHERE CHANGED; EACH GROUP BEGAN BARGAINING FOR ITS OWN INTERESTS AND RIGIDITY SET IN. IN HIS VIEW, THE US HAD HAD A MORE FLEXIBLE POSITION AT THE RECENT SESSION OF CIEC, EVEN TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE SMALLER INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES WERE CONCERNED ABOUT IT. A HIGH SWEDISH OFFICIAL HAD COMMENTED TO HIM THAT THE REASON THE US COULD AFFORD TO BE LIBERAL IN CIEC WAS BECAUSE IT HAD OTHER MEANS OF PRESSURING LATIN AMERICA.

34. MRS. CARTER WONDERED WHERE THE WORLD WOULD GO AFTER CIEC? SILVEIRA CONSIDERED A MORE SELECTIVE APPROACH IN CHOOSING COUNTRIES TO ENGAGE IN THE DISCUSSION, POSSIBLY WORKED OUT BY THE LESS DEVELOPED THROUGH THE G-77. THIS WOULD MAKE IT MORE MANAGEABLE AND MORE PRACTICAL. UNCTAD, HE COMMENTED, IS BECOMING TOO POLITICAL TO BE REALISTIC. BRAZIL IS NOT INTERESTED IN GOING INTO SUCH MEETINGS JUST TO CRY AS OTHER LDCS DO.

35. MRS. CARTER SOUGHT SILVEIRA'S VIEWS OF CUBA'S ROLE IN AFRICA. AS SILVEIRA SAW IT, THE CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA WILL HAVE TO SAY THERE AND BECOME FARMERS, AS NO ONE WANTS THEM BACK IN CUBA. THE CENTRAL AMERICANS DON'T, GUYANA DOESN'T, EVEN CASTRO HIMSELF DOESN'T. SILVEIRA RECALLED THAT BRAZIL IN 1975 HAD CONSULTED SEVERAL MAJOR POWERS, INCLUDING THE US, UK AND FRANCE, BEFORE RECOGNIZING THE MPLA REGIME IN ANGOLA. ONLY A WEEK LATER IT WAS

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REVEALED THAT CUBAN TROOPS WERE PRESENT IN ANGOLA. BRAZIL'S PRESENCE IN ANGOLA IS PROTECTED BY AGOSTINHO NETO, HE SAID. ACCORDING TO BRAZIL'S INFORMATION, MPLA DISSIDENT AND COUP LEADER NITO ALVES WAS A RADICAL AND HAD ACCUSED AGOSTINHO NETO OF BEING ANTI-SOVIET. NITO ALVES WAS NOT A NATIONALIST BUT EXTENSIVELY LINKED TO THE SOVIETS. ALSO ACCORDING TO BRAZIL'S INFORMATION, CUBAN TROOPS HAD NOT DONE VERY MUCH DURING THE COUP. IN THE EARLY STAGES THEY LEANED TOWARD NITO ALVES BUT THEN HAD SWUNG TO THE SIDE OF

AGOSTINHO NETO. SILVEIRA NOTED THAT THE CUBAN TROOPS MOVE AROUND WITHIN ANGOLA ALWAYS ARMED BECAUSE OF FEAR OF THE LOCAL POPULACE. NETO HAS USED THEM TO MAINTAIN STABILITY.

36. AMBASSADOR TODMAN ASKED WHY THE CUBAN TROOPS HAD GONE IN THE FIRST PLACE. ACCORDING TO SILVEIRA, IT WAS BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WANTED THEM THERE, KNOWING THAT THEY WOULD BE THE BEST AGENTS OF THE SOVIETS AND THAT RACIALLY THEY WOULD FIT IN BETTER THAN EUROPEAN FORCES. SILVEIRA CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT WE MAY NOT LIKE THE MPLA, BUT WHAT IS BETTER? THE NLA FOR EXAMPLE, IS A FOREIGN MOVEMENT WITHIN ANGOLA. TO SUPPORT IT WOULD BE LIKE SUPPORTING A BOLIVIAN MOVEMENT IN PARAGUAY.

37 MRS. CARTER CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING HER SATISFACTION WITH THE CONVERSATION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ADDING THAT SHE HAD A FEW OTHER POINTS THAT SHE MIGHT LIKE TO RAISE WITH HIM HOPING THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TIME TO DISCUSS THEM. FOREIGN MINISTER MINISTER SILVEIRA ALSO VOICED HIS PLEASURE WITH THE CONVERSATION AND ASSURED MRS. CARTE THAT HE WOULD BE AT HER DISPOSITION AT ANY TIME.

38. AMBASSADOR'S DRAFT MEMCON OF MRS. CARTER'S CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT GEISEL BEING SENT TO BOGOTA FOR HER REVIEW. FINAL MEMCON WILL BE TRANSMITTED FROM PARTY THERE.
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Message Attributes

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Concepts: MEETINGS
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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